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Introduction 
 
In August of 1998 Russian banking system faced the most devastating 
crisis in its history. Although before the time there were another banking 
crises in Russia it was the first one that resulted in such a huge number of 
banks’ failures. More than 60% of large and multidivisional banks closed their 
doors (table below). 
 
Solvency and Financial conditions of Russian banks January 1999 
Types of banks    required f. 
support 
didn’t require f. 
Support 
 Quantity  Total 
assets 
Quantity  Total 
assets 
Multifunctional banks with large number of 
branches 
4 145,7 0 0 
Large 14 328 5 139,7 
System banks 26 29,8 53 25,2 
Other 397 208,8 974 157 
Total 441 712,4 441 712,4 
Source: survey of IC “Troika Dialog” “The Russian Banking sector: Life after Death” 
 
Through the destruction of the saving and payment systems the crisis 
extremely severely affected the state of the economy as a whole. Thus the 
refusal to pay back deposits caused the loss of the population trust in banks 
as a way of saving. Nonfulfilment of obligations to foreign creditors sharply cut 
down the access of Russian companies to foreign credit sources. The 
bankruptcy of almost all multidivisional banks caused a significant decrease in 
the quality of banking service etc. Though the factors and a number of others 
caused by the banking crisis worsened not only current state of Russian 
economic agents but considerably complicated their ability for future 
development. 
Such a severe influence of the crisis and its unexpected occurrence 
stimulated researchers to study the reasons of the fall. They distinguished a 
number of economic factors that acted as the main source of the crisis (see 
Appendix). At the same time institutional aspects were not considered. 
Meanwhile, a proper banking regulation together with the toughening of 
control over compliance with the requirements could not only reduce losses of 
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the economy in 1998, but even could lessen the probability of the crisis 
occurrence. 
This work is meant to fill in the gap. It presents an attempt to describe 
and analyse most significant shortcomings of Russian regulation system and 
present possible ways for its improvement. The main attention is paid to 
possible effects of the capital and reserve requirements toughening. The 
examination is based on the experience of developed countries and in most 
complicated cases (toughening of capital and reserve requirements) a 
theoretical model is also applied. 
The most interesting result of the paper is the description of possible 
effect of the capital and reserve requirements. It was shown that in Russian 
reality, when a lot of banks had long-term investment portfolios and 
insufficient funds for their financing, these two regulations could have positive 
effect. In particular, it was demonstrated that in case, well-timed toughening of 
capital and reserve requirement applied to large Russian banks could 
considerably improve their stability. However, in case of banks with 
comparably small long-term portfolios the same regulation could have 
opposite effect. Furthermore, it was shown that introduction of bank 
specialisation could make possible improvement of soundness of both groups 
of banks. 
 
Literature review 
 
The problem of the optimal implementation of banking regulations is very 
important but is extremely complicated too. These two characteristics of 
banking regulations forced researchers to spend time on investigations in this 
area. Nowadays a huge number of different papers consider various aspects 
of regulations. 
General regulation theory is concerned with the design of the optimal 
regulatory rules. It is therefore mainly normative. However, only a minor part 
of the literature on banking regulation follows this “regulation design” 
approach. The main part of papers uses a “positive” approach- “regulation 
analysis. Because the influence of regulation is very difficult to distinguish, 
most of these papers use mathematics models. 
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These papers can be divided into three groups: free banking, various bank 
regulations and the optimal choice of banking regulations.   
The first group presents articles, which argue that there is no need to 
control any activities of bank to obtain a stable general equilibrium. The most 
famous paper in this group is Fama (1980). According to Fama (1980) there 
is no reason to regulate banks or banking competition with respect to payment 
services and portfolio management: a competitive outcome would be optimal. 
In making the case for free banking, this paper and other such as Wallace 
(1983), Rolnick and Weber (1983) and White (1984) have presented some 
challenging ideas. Nonetheless, the cases made for free banking in the 
literature remain unconvincing. First, it is not clear that the incomplete 
historical analysis concerning the 19th century holds relevance for the modern 
integrated economy. Second, either implicitly or explicitly, most analyses of 
the banking sector have assumed the existence of economies with centralised 
markets and with complete information available to all parties. Moreover, 
models with centralised trade and complete information are incapable of 
answering arguments traditionally made against free banking.  
The second group of paper proves that ‘Free banking always results in a 
bank crisis’. In particular, they show that a possible banking sector failure is 
associated with classes of information-related functions of banks. For 
example, the fixed claim demand deposit contract allowing an early 
withdrawal of funds ensures optimal risk sharing, but simultaneously makes a 
panic bank run possible (Diamond, Dygvig 1983, Jacklin 1983 and 
Haubrich 1985) or a fundamental or information-based bank run when 
depositors have information about the return of the bank and the value of its 
assets may also trigger bank insolvency (Jacklin, Bhattaharia 1988). Papers 
from the group also stresses attention on the risk-taking bias implied by the 
inability of depositors (possibly encouraged by deposit insurance to invest in 
deposits) to observe the asset portfolio risk chosen by the bank (Merton 
1977, 1978, Bhattaharia 1982). It is shown that in such a world, capital 
requirements may reduce risk taking. A number of papers analyse the link 
between competition and prudential concerns. They have stressed the fact 
that the expectation of future rents makes it more costly for a bank to fail and 
introduces a mitigating factor against excessive risk taking. Bhattacharya 
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(1982) has argued that deposit rate ceilings could act as a deterrent, but could 
be Pareto worsening too if inducing a large increase in risk taking. Chan, 
Greenbaum, and Thakor (1992) have argued that the existence of sufficient 
rents may be a precondition for a useful role for risk-sensitive deposit 
insurance premiums. 
The last group of papers is concerned with the problem of optimal use of 
regulations and does not discuss the question “Whether any regulation is 
desirable or not?”. They take the statement that ‘Regulation is useful’ as 
given, and focus their attention on the problem of optimal use of regulations.  
The mostly well developed method in modern literature is deposit 
insurance. The aim of this regulation is to avoid bank panics and their social 
costs. A number of papers shows how deposit insurance could provide a 
solution to bank runs (Wallace 1988). Problems associated with the 
implementation of the insurance and its effects on the banking industry are 
considered in another group of papers. Merton (1977) proposes method for 
finding the appropriate pricing policy for deposit insurance using the arbitrage 
pricing. Gennote and Pyle(1991) shows that deposit guarantees would lead 
to inefficient investment and that the increase in bank capital requirements 
could not compensate for the increase in risk. 
The influence of capital requirements on banks’ investment decisions is 
considered in the next papers (Blum 1999, Park 1997, Kane 1995, Berger 
1995). Berger examines the role of capital in financial institutions- why it is 
important, how market-generated capital requirements differ from regulatory 
requirements, and the form that regulatory requirements should take. Along 
the way, he examines historical trends in bank capital, problems in measuring 
capital, and some possible unintended consequences of capital requirements. 
Within the framework, he evaluates how the contributions to this special issue 
advance the literature and suggest topics for future research. J. Blum uses a 
dynamic framework. The paper shows that capital adequacy rules may 
increase a bank’s riskiness. In addition to the standard negative effect of rent 
on risk attitudes of banks further intertemporal effect has to be considered. 
The intuition behind the result is that under binding capital requirements an 
additional unit of equity tomorrow is more valuable to a bank. If raising equity 
is excessively costly, the only possibility to increase equity tomorrow is to 
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increase risk today. S. Park analyses the value maximisation of regulated 
banks within a moral-hazard framework. The paper presents an interesting 
result. Larger charter value results in a higher-risk interior solution. 
Thomas F. Hellmann et al. (1998) considers another type of regulation. 
They consider the implementation of deposit rate restrictions and capital 
requirements. Hellman shows that competition could undermine prudent bank 
behaviour. Capital requirements reduce gambling incentives by putting equity 
at risk. Any Pareto-efficient outcome can be achieved by adding deposit rate 
controls as a regulatory instrument. Even if deposit rate ceilings are not 
binding on the equilibrium path, they may be useful in deterring gambling off 
the equilibrium path. 
Another method, the portfolio regulation examined by Crouhy and Galai 
(1986), Kim and Santomero (1988). The main idea is that if banks behave as 
portfolio managers when they choose the composition of their portfolio of 
assets and liabilities, then it is important to use risk-related weights for the 
computation of the capital to asset ratio. For example, Kim (1988) paper 
investigates the role of bank capital regulation in risk control. Utilising the 
mean-variance model, the paper shows that the use of simple capital ratios in 
regulation is an ineffective mean to bind the insolvency risk of banks, 
moreover it derives risk weights under the risk based capital plan. Another 
example is J. Blum (1999) paper. It demonstrates that although, in principle, 
portfolio regulation may reduce the probability of bank failure, its current 
implementation may produce perverse results. That is, bank portfolio 
regulation, by restricting high-risk, high-return assets, may actually increase 
the probability of bank failure. And it proposes a more efficient method of 
portfolio regulation, which eliminates the probability of the regulation leading 
to greater rather than smaller total exposure. This paper belongs to this group. 
Although it considers all shortcomings of Russian banking legislation, the 
main attention is paid to the problem of optimal use of portfolio regulation. It 
analysis the impact of capital and reserve requirements regulations on bank 
risk by assuming that banks can invest in projects that have a positive NPV 
denoted there as long term investments. One of main results is that although 
capital and reserve requirements could have positive as well as negative 
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effect on bank stability, in Russian case it was reasonable to tougher this 
regulation. 
 
Literature used for the description of the causes of the banking crisis 
 
The analysis is based on the empirical papers presented by the leading 
Russian economists during the last year. 
“Banking system of Russia: crisis and future prospects.” published by 
an analytical laboratory “Vedi” in 1999 contains a complete analysis of 
changes, that Russian banking system undergo as a result of August crisis in 
1998. The authors investigate in details the major prerequisites of the banking 
crisis. A special attention is paid to the interdependence between banks and 
the state bond market. In addition, there is a thorough description of banks’ 
relations with Russian and foreign economic agents.  
Another paper containing a valuable analysis of banks’ bankruptcy 
causes is the report “The Banking Crisis: Was fog dissipated?” published by 
the Development Center. Most of the Center’s researchers had a reach 
working experience in the CB and the report gives to external analyst a 
chance to examine the crisis from the point of view of the people directly 
involved in the process of the decision making. 
The third example of papers, that contain an attempt to describe 
causes of banks’ destruction, is A. Astapovoch and D. Sirmolotov paper 
“Russian banks in 1998: the developments of the system crisis”. 
 In addition data from different other papers were used too such as the 
surveys of the investment company “Troika-Dialog”: “The Russian Banking 
Sector: Life after Death” and “The Russian banking Sector at Crossroad”. The 
papers contain extensive analysis of the banks’ foreign market activities. In 
addition, some data were taken from A. Chernyvskiy paper “The perspectives 
banking crisis overcoming in Russia”. 
 
The review of institutional and regulatory frameworks for the bank 
systems of developed countries and Russia. 
Before the discussion of Russian banking regulation shortcoming and 
their comparison with Western countries experience, let us depict main 
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characteristics of Western and Russian banking legislation. 
Italy 
The Italian banking sector consists of commercial, savings, co-
operative and rural banks, which according to the Banking Law of 1936 
(frequently amended) form the group of credit institutions authorised to 
receive deposits and grant credits for their own account. Credit institutions 
and Postal Administration are the main providers of payment services. The 
Bank of Italy supervises stability and competition in the banking system, as 
well as activities of non-banks operating in the payment system.  
The distinct feature is the still remaining significant specialisation within 
the banking system as banks’ equity participation in non-financial firms is 
banned. Bank ownership is not explicitly provisioned, but the Bank of Italy, 
which is in charge of the anti-trust policy, has overseen that non-financial 
companies do not exercise dominant influence over banks. In regard to other 
structural regulations, the establishment of open-ended mutual funds was 
allowed and their functioning regulated in 1983, and in 1988 the direct linking 
of money market mutual funds to banks checking accounts was permitted. 
Open-ended mutual funds have developed briskly and compete directly with 
banks over household savings. Investment banking activities were allowed for 
commercial banks in 1977.  
The deregulation of conduct speeded up in the late 1980s.  
Short-term lending was allotted to commercial banks and the medium- and 
long-term lending to special institutions. In 1983 an agreement on lending and 
borrowing rates and a quantitative ceiling on bank loans, and in 1987 the 
requirements of non-interest bearing deposits against foreign assets were 
abolished. Restrictions on the establishment of bank branches were partially 
relaxed in 1987, while the final liberalisation took place in 1990. High reserve 
requirements have been used in Italy to ensure financial stability and exercise 
monetary control.  
France 
The banking law classifies the credit institutions into four categories. 
Commercial banks that perform all types of banking and associated 
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operations like foreign exchange transactions and marketing of transferable 
securities and financial products. Structured network of banks, which 
comprise mutual and co-operative banks. Finance companies engage mainly 
in lending or securities trading according to the limits of their statuses. They 
are not generally allowed to take deposits from the public for terms of less 
than two years. Specialised financial institutions carry out duties of public 
interest assigned by the state, and are not authorised to conduct operations 
not related to their assignments 
In France a uniform legal framework for the conduct of banking 
operations is provided by the Banking Law of 1984.The Law imposes upper 
limits for credit institutions to engage in other than banking activities. The net 
income from these may not be greater than 10% of the global net income of a 
credit institution. France has undertaken a significant deregulation of conduct 
mainly during the 1980s. The bank lending rates were deregulated already in 
1967, but the controls on credit volume persisted. They were removed 
partially in 1984 and totally cancelled in 1986.Since 1986, interest rates on 
time deposits with maturity over three months can freely follow market rates, 
and banks' service charges, various commissions and fee, are fully 
unrestricted. However, nominal rate on demand deposits is still laid down by 
rulings of the Committee on Banking regulations. Establishments of the 
branches was liberalised at the beginning of the 1980s, which led to an 
intense competition over market shares via opening of new branches. Since 
1990 France follows the EC Directive on Solvency Ratios, which has meant 
adjustment to stronger requirements. As to structural regulations, the 
specialisation within the banking system was ended in 1984 as universal 
banking operation were fully allowed. Remaining capital controls were 
cancelled partly in 1986, and full liberalisation was achieved in 1990.  
 
 Germany 
German banking system is the least regulated market in Europe 
without any significant structural and conduct regulations. German universal 
banks conduct a full range of both commercial and investment banking 
services, but do not constitute a homogeneous sector of banks. According to 
respective legal statuses, universal banks are divided into commercial, saving 
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banks and credit co-operatives, which each have separate banking 
associations and deposit protection schemes. Commercial banks are 
organised as limited liability companies and comprise also different 
subgroups. The first one comprises the largest commercial banks that operate 
nation-wide branch and own giro transfer networks. The second set consists 
of commercial banks concentrating strictly regionally or operating only a few 
branches nation-wide, and the last consist of single banks, branches and 
subsidiaries of foreign banks and private bankers. 
The only tough restriction is the capital requirements that are high even 
in European standards. Other quantitative restrictions regarding  equity, 
liquidity, investments, large-scale loans  and loan concentration aiming at 
protecting the functioning of the banking system have been in general less 
restrictive then the stipulations of the EC Directives. 
 
The United Kingdom 
The UK banking market consists of authorised banks organised as 
public limited companies operating under the Bank Act of 1987, and of 
building societies ruled by the Building Societies Act of 1986. Authorised 
banks are divided into two distinct subgroups. Namely, clearing banks offering 
a wide range of banking services, and other authorised banks consisting of 
smaller deposit-taking banks, consortium banks, discount houses and foreign-
owned banks. 
The UK banking market has been historically slightly regulated, as the 
German system, compared to other European countries. In 1986 authorised 
banks, both domestic and foreign, were allowed to engage in securities 
business allowing them to conduct universal banking. Most stringent structural 
and conduct regulations have been pertained to building societies. By the 
1986 Act building societies were allowed to engage in unsecured lending and 
to provide credit cards that led to an expansion of services provided especially 
by the largest societies. The interest rate recommendations for building 
societies were cancelled in 1984, and wholesale borrowing was gradually 
permitted for the societies between 1980 and 1988. In 1989 new solvency 
ratios in accordance with BIS requirements were implemented. There are no 
constraints on banks' ownership in non-financial firms in the UK. 
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Spain 
According to the Spanish Banking Law of 1988 credit institutions 
engage in borrowing funds and granting loans on their own account. The 
banking system consists of commercial banks, saving banks and credit co-
operatives. Each of three bank groups has heir own deposit guarantee fund, 
which are financed by banks in proportion to their liabilities and by 
contributions from the Bank of Spain, Banking supervision is carried out jointly 
by the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Spain. 
Currently prevailing regulations do not give a competitive edge to any 
of the three groups of institutions, since saving banks and credit co-operatives 
are authorised to perform identical functions as the commercial banks. 
Company finance has been traditionally handled by commercial banks, but 
saving banks compete increasingly with commercial banks in this market. 
Individual saving banks are grouped into two separate entities, namely the 
Confederation of Saving Banks and the public Postal Savings Bank. Other 
financial institutions operating in Spain are Official Credit Institutions: the 
Institute of Official Credit and the Official Credit Banks. 
The Spanish banking system has undergone a very rapid liberalisation 
process during 1980s’ from a heavily regulated system to close free-market 
business where most conduct and structural rules have been removed. Entry 
of domestic institutions was significantly restricted until 1988 shielding the 
incumbent institutions from competition. Interest rate and commissions 
regulations were lifted gradually between 1977 and 1987, and credit ceilings 
by 1990. Establishment of branches was freed totally in 1985 for commercial 
banks, but some restrictions remained for savings banks until 1990. Spain has 
adhered to discretionary regulations against foreign banks in regard to 
establishment of branches and composition of their assets and liabilities. Only 
some of the restrictions were lifted between 1986 and 1992. Thus, a 
significant change took place on January 1 1993 when the establishment and 
operations of foreign-owned banks were liberalised abolishing the 
discretionary power of the Spanish authorities. Another significant change in 
regulations concerns the solvency requirements. Replacement of BIS 
standards by the EC standard denotes a strengthening of requirements to 
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some extent, since in Spain, as in Germany and Italy, the importance of 
undisclosed reserves through the undervaluation of securities has been 
higher than elsewhere.  
 
 The banking deregulation in the EC. 
The banking deregulation in the EC area began in the late 1970 that 
along with the liberalisation of capital flows has significantly affected the 
evolution of the banking markets. The adopted EC legislation and the 
anticipation of future developments have significantly contributed to this 
process by triggering changes in national regulations. 
Firstly, regulations on banks' competitive conduct have been relaxed 
and largely eliminated having significant behavioural effects on the respective 
banking industries by enhancing price competition. Secondly, deregulation of 
structural rules led to the adoption of the universal banking model as set up by 
the Second Banking Derivative in all countries. 
Japan 
Banking is one of the most heavily regulated industries in post-war 
Japan. Within industry, long-term banking and short-term banking have been 
separated; only trust banks have provided trust-banking services. Until the 
late 1970s most interest rates were set at non-market clearing levels. In 
addition, informational administrative guidelines have been widely used. The 
regulatory authorities protected banks essentially in three ways: First, many 
forms of subsidies were provided, including those arising from interest rate 
regulations, entry restrictions, and Bank of Japan (BOJ) lending at the 
discount rate. Second, significant portions of credit risks were borne by the 
government. Public financial institutions supplied funds jointly with private 
banks. The trust fund bureau bought large amounts of debentures issued by 
long-term credit banks. Most important of all, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) 
and the BOJ rescued troubled banks by any possible means. Third, the flow 
of funds through the capital market, especially the bond market, was severely 
controlled. Moreover, the decline in management efficiency expected from 
such heavy protection was minimised by the MOF's guidelines to limit bank 
expenses 
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Financial liberalisation of Japanese banking sector has been started in 
late 1980s. Many have attributed to the significant liberalisation that has taken 
place to the sharp increase in government budget deficits in the late 1970s 
and the resulting need to sell large amounts of government bonds. As 
discussed earlier, bank protection took three forms: discouragement of 
competition, sharing of credit risks by the government, and the restriction of 
direct finance. Part, but not all, of the first and third types of regulations were 
gradually relaxed. Most significant among these was the gradual deregulation 
of interest rates. But still the banking system of Japan is highly regulated. 
USA 
The building of regulatory system was started from passing the Federal 
Reserve Act of 1913. This act created Federal Reserve System. As it was in 
Japan the banking collapse of the Great Depression was viewed, rightly or 
wrongly, as being the result of excessive risk taking by banks. The legislation 
of the 1930s attempted to reduce such risk taking in number of ways. It limited 
competition by restrictions on geographic competition and by capping the 
rates banks could pay on deposits. It also segmented the financial structure to 
limit competition and to keep banks out of areas thought to be too risky. Under 
the new rules, commercial banks were to accept checking deposits and make 
commercial loan; investment bank were to underwrite and broker securities; 
thrifts were to accept time deposits and write mortgages; insurance 
companies were to accept insurance. No one type of financial institution was 
to invade the turf of any other. 
The principal vehicle of this segmentation was the Glass-Steagall Act 
of 1933, which separated commercial and investment banking. The Bank 
Holding Company Act of 1956, which restricted the affiliation of banking and 
non-financial corporations, set banking further apart. The S&L Holding 
Company Act of 1969 did the same for S&Ls. 
In addition to these measures to limit completion and risk taking, the 
government sought to promote stability directly by providing a guarantee in 
the form of deposit insurance. Congress added an additional layer of 
protection in the form of federal deposit insurance. The federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was to insure deposits up to a limit of 2,500 $ 
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per depositor. All banks, not only members of the Federal Reserve System 
were eligible for this insurance. A parallel system was set up for saving and 
loans under the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC). 
However, deposit insurance was not entirely a new idea. Eight Western and 
Southern states had set up state-sponsored deposit insurance scheme after 
1907. This system sunk after 1920's agricultural depression. Nowadays, the 
FDIC insured deposits at more than 10000 banks with more than 2.5$ trillion 
in deposits among them. Before 1989 FDIC insured only banks(commercial, 
saving bank and insured branches of the foreign banks); S&Ls were insured 
by FSLIC. However the S&L crisis bankrupted FSLIC, and it was taken over 
by FDIC. Each depositors is insured up to a maximum of 100,000$ in principal 
and accrued interests. Both banks and S&Ls pay an insurance premium of 
0.23$ per 100$of deposits on all deposits, even those not fully insured. The 
cost of insurance has increased almost eight times from 1985 to 1993. But 
there are still some serious problems with solvency of FDIC. Because of bank 
failures in the late 1980s the reserves of FDIC ran out in 1991.It covered its 
losses by borrowing from the Treasury. 
The desire to protect unsophisticated individuals motivated the Security 
Acts of 1933 and 1934. The acts require issuers of new securities to register 
with the SEC and to disclose all relevant information. Corporations whose 
securities are traded publicly are required to disclose information periodically. 
The Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968, also known as the Truth-in-
Lending Act, requires lenders to provide borrowers with accurate information 
about the cost of credit so they can more readily shop around. The Equal 
Opportunity Act of 1974 prohibits discrimination in credit evaluation. In 
addition, FED is charged with administering these laws.  
(This description is based on literature listed in Appendix) 
 
Russia 1991-Aug 1998. 
The first steps in the creation of prudential supervision legislation was 
undertaken by Central Bank shortly after its foundation. First document in this 
area was CBR Instruction №1 (Apr 30 1991) “About regulation of commercial 
banks activities”. It determined standards for capital adequacy, liquidity, risk 
per borrower and mandatory reserves of commercial banks. This document 
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with different variations existed until the end of 1995 and acted as one of the 
principal document of the Central Bank. 
Only after interbank market crisis of August of 1995 the CB renewed its 
activities in the field of remote control.  New edition replaced the previous 
variant of Instruction №1. In this new edition the list of standards was 
significantly enlarged. 
• Minimum size of capital of new banks; 
• Minimal amount of own assets for existing bank; 
• Capital adequacy standards (h1); 
• Liquidity standards(h2, 3, 4, 5); 
• Maximum size if risk per borrower or group of linked borrowers (h6); 
• Maximum size of credits or warrants, granted by banks to its stockholders 
and insiders (h8, 9, 10); 
• Maximum amount of deposits of population (h11); 
• Maximum amount of demand notes (h12, 12.1, 13); 
Later it was extended with Instruction №59 (Mar 31 1997) “About 
application to credit institutions of discipline for violation of prudential norms”. 
According to this documents, prudential norms were defined as determined by 
Central Bank: 
• Amounts of risks taken by credit institutions; 
• Reserves created to assure liquidity and possible losses coverage; 
• Requirements, violation of which can negatively affect financial conditions 
of credit institutions or possibility of accurate estimation if financial 
activities, including requirements for financial accounting and reporting. 
These two documents were extended with the instruction that defined 
the notion of ‘problem’ bank. Letter of Bank of Russia №457 28.05.97 “On 
criteria of financial conditions of banks” was issued to refine the methodology 
of banks supervision and better condition for application of adequate 
measures. In particular, it defined the distinction between stable and problem 
banks. Although the notion of ‘problem group’ existed before that (CBR Letter 
№457 28.05.97) «On criteria of determining financial standings of banks»), 
new classification of banks was less formal and therefore more applicable. 
Especially unimportant was highlighting of quality of banks accounting, as in 
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general, violation in this field correspond with low qualification of accounting 
personnel or of intentional violations of banking law. Both of these factors will 
certainly lead the bank into severe problems. 
Together with the developing of different regulation instruments CB 
issued a number of documents, which established the applications of different 
measures to banks-violators. According to CB Instruction №59 (31.05.97) the 
choice of measures was made according to character of violations, reasons 
for revelation, and financial conditions of credit institutions. Financial 
conditions was determined on the base of bank’s accounting reports, results 
of inspections and auditors’ conclusions according to CB Letter №265. 
At the fall of 1997 Central Bank, worried about possible negative effect 
of Asian crisis on Russian banking system, renewed its activities in prudential 
supervision and took a number of measures to improve the existing 
legislation. The most significant one was the new edition of Instruction №1. 
The document was introduced on October 1 1997 and had been amended 
until the beginning of 1997. This document determined more accurately the 
procedure of calculation of existing standards and introduced several new 
norms (liquidity was  on precious metals operations (n14)). 
This document together with Instruction №1 of 23.03.97 was of 
additional importance for banks as it increased the minimal required level of 
capital. From Jan 1 1999 new value of minimal capital (determined as sum of 
registered capital, bank funds and non-distributed profit) was set at 5mln 
ECU. Banks, whose own capital lay between 1mln ECU and 5mln ECU was 
prohibited to make some operations and restriction of branch network 
development was introduced (later on, after the beginning of banking crisis, 
this requirement was eased). This way a lot of banks were made to change 
their status in a year as a majority of medium- and small-sized banks had to 
join larger structures or merge with them. Understanding that even in Moscow 
more than 25% of banks failed to satisfy the requirement, the CB issued a 
number of documents to ease the process of consolidation. First of these was 
Regulation №12-П of 30.12.97. This document accurately regulated the 
procedure of merger. As bank was not considered as newly created, it was 
not affected by registered capital standard. After merger new institution was 
got a license which contained full list of banking operations permitted for any 
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of merged banks. If one of the banks had general license, new structure 
inherited it. In case of joining the larger (i.e. the one that was joining) bank 
retain its license or got the new one – if joined bank had a general license or 
the one that permitted larger list of operations than larger bank. The 
Regulation also determined the procedure of registration of securities during 
the merger or joining and the order of conversion of their shares. Moreover, a 
number of documents, which regulated a limit of non-monetary part of 
registered capital, minimum amount of reserves for high-risk assets and 
coefficients for currency, interest rate and other risks were issued 
 
Description and analysis of deficiencies of banking regulation 
 
It is very difficult to underestimate the value of the Central Bank work in 
the years preceding the crisis. During the time it managed to make Russian 
banking legislation compatible with standards of foreign countries, a lot of 
actions were undertaken to ensure implementation of the decisions etc. At the 
same time reviewing CB job as regulating institute with regard to banking 
stability we have to admit that the constructed regulatory system was 
inadequate. And the August crisis is the most illustrative and direct evidence 
of the fact. It demonstrated that there were a lot of problems in Russian 
banking system concerned with its insufficient regulation. The deficiencies lay 
in ignoring the methods that proved their efficiency in countries with unstable  
economies, and secondly in inefficient use of existent regulations. 
For instance one of the most substantial problems of Russian banking system 
was an excessive number of credit organizations. The number of banks 
increased five times during only two years. Moreover even in 1996-1997 when 
it began to decrease the growth of competition held because the large banks 
proceeded to expand their business in regions. For example SBS-Agro had 
more than 200 branches at the end of 1997. 
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In particular it leaded to the increase in degree of competition between 
financial institutions reducing profitability and thus value of existing domestic 
banks. It forced banks to engage in gambling activities, which in turn 
worsened their financial state. Moreover the superfluity of banking 
organisations resulted in the fact that majority of them had very small own 
capital and client base. Additionally it significantly complicated activities of 
supervising authorities.  
Taking in account the problems described above it looks so strange 
that the CB did nothing to prevent the increase in the number of credit 
organisations. While the experience of developed countries demonstrates that 
there were a number of regulations suitable for the decrease in number of 
banks and bank competition as well as for the avoidance of its consequences. 
One of the most famous and widely used methods of such a type is the 
direct restriction on the creation of new credit organisation and the expansion 
of existing one. While this solution was very popular in developed countries 
such as Japan, Canada and EU countries during unstable periods Russian 
regulatory authorities never used it. Thus in Italy restrictions on the 
establishment of bank branches were partially relaxed only in 1987.In similar 
manner in Spain the entry of domestic institutions was significantly restricted 
until 1988. In USA the restrictions are still in force (McFadden-Pepper Act 
(1927) and a number acts issued by states governments). 
In addition to the direct restrictions the CB had another ways for the 
avoidance of excessive competition and its consequences. In particular it 
could apply deposit rate ceilings or increase the minimal required level of own 
capital.  
The purpose of the deposit rate controls is to prevent interest rate 
competition that is destructive to the profitability of financial institution. The 
restriction was very popular in developed countries such as USA, Japan and 
Europe. Thus the Japanese deposit rates were confined by the “Temporary 
A number of credit organisation in Russia
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Interest rate Adjustment Law” of 1947. In USA it was presented by the 
regulation Q that were abolished only in early 1980’s (regulation Q prohibited 
payments of interest on business checking accounts, and allow the federal 
Reserve to pay interest on commercial bank balances required to be held at 
the Federal Reserve). In France the bank lending rates were deregulated in 
1986, however nominal rates on demand deposits are still laid down by 
rulings of the Committee of Banking regulations. In Italy the regulation was 
abolished only in 1987. In Finland the regulation on banks’ average lending 
rate were lifted step-by-step between 1983 and 1986, however the interest 
rates charged on a stock of loans still tied to the Bank of Finland base rate. 
Without regard to on the popularity of the methods it was factually not used in 
Russia. There was only one indirect restriction on interest rates charged by 
tax collecting authorities. 
The second method the minimal capital requirement was used by the 
CB, but even it was used inefficiently. For the first until 1997 the minimal 
required level was defined in Russian currency which was subject to high 
inflation. Moreover the minimal required level was too low. Thus only at the 
beginning of 1996 it was defined in foreign currency and increased to 1 million 
ECU. The level was too low in comparison with major banking systems. Thus 
in EU countries The Second Banking Directive stipulates a minimum capital 
requirement of five million ECU to commerce banking operations. 
The second problem that the CB failed to take into account was bank 
specialisation. Russia seems to be the only country that did not introduced 
bank specialisation at early stages of banking system development. Although 
this method was widely used in developed countries. In USA commercial and 
investment banking were separated in 1933 by Glass-Steagall Act. In Italy 
investment banking activities were allowed for commercial banks only in 1977. 
And although in other European countries the direct division did not 
implemented but supervisory authorities assumed that banking system consist 
of different groups and constructed the legislation on the base of it. Thus 
Spain credit institutions divided into private banks, saving banks and credit co-
operatives and each of the three bank groups has own deposit guarantee 
funds.  
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The third problem was the fact that the legislation concerning banking 
sector relationships with other sectors was very weak. In particular the 
problem of banking holdings was not considered. There was no definition of 
banking holdings, who and how supervise them etc. The only document in this 
area was CB Regulation 12.05.98 «On consolidated accounting of credit 
institutions», but it was not enough for adequate supervision. 
The next feature of Russian banking sector that negatively affected its 
stability was the lack of legislation concerning bank bankruptcy. In fact, facing 
the banking crisis the CB could not execute its own decisions. The illustrative 
examples of that were the cases referred to banks SBS-Agro and Menatep. It 
looks absolutely strange because Bank of Russia had similar problems during 
the previous banking crisis. Furthermore, not much attention was paid to the 
issue of creditors’ rights. There was no notions concerning the responsibility 
of large stockholders and banks managers. In particular it resulted in the fact 
that a majority of large bankrupt banks managed to create “mirror” banks, to 
which their businesses were transferred. The most famous cases are 
presented in the table below. 
 
Bank Mirror bank 
MFK 
ОНЭКСИМ 
ROSBANK, Baltoneximbank 
Russian Credit IMPEXBANK 
MENATEP MENATEP St-Piterburg 
Imperial Petrocommertsbank 
SBS-Agro Perviy Ob'edinenniy Valutniy Bank 
 
In addition to it, Russian banking system featured an excess riskiness 
of banks' behaviour. At the same time there existed a number of ways to 
reduce it. According to western countries experience it was possible to use 
reserve requirements, restriction on off-balance operations and open foreign 
currency positions etc. These methods were also used in Russia. 
Nevertheless a number of shortcomings concerning their application is worth 
mentioning. For instance, before the crisis of 1998 CB viewed GKOs as 
riskless assets and required zero backing. It indirectly forced banks to include 
GKO-OFZ in their portfolios while the riskiness of government securities at the 
beginning of 1998 significantly increased and corresponded to 4th (or even 5th) 
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group risk. In the field of off-balance operations CB was also passive. 
Moreover, banks were stimulated to sign forward currency contracts which 
allowed the government to increase GKO attractiveness. As a result a large 
portfolio of forward contracts negatively affected the stability of banking 
institutions at time of the crisis. The situation with capital adequacy and 
reserve requirements a little bit more complicated. It is impossible to say 
whether its level was optimal basing only on the experience of other countries, 
so let us analyse it with the help of the model analysis. 
 
Theoretical part 
Influence of the capital and reserve requirement toughening 
 
1. The description of the model from the economic point of view 
 
Before we turn to the description of economic and mathematical formulation of 
the model, let us examine principal assumptions. 
 
Firstly, the presented approach does not consider competition, while in reality 
its level was rather high. It is due to the fact that regulation methods analyzed 
in the framework are not concerned with the decrease in the level of 
competition. Additionally, the funds allocation market implied no direct 
competition as all large lenders belonged to either bank or FIG. On the market 
of short-term investments at times of GKO existence the level of competition 
was low as government covered the demand. The only field where large 
banks faced significant opposition of smaller institutions was the market of 
low-profit low-risk or riskless operations. But this fact was neglected in order 
to simplify mathematics of the model. 
The previous motive also caused the use of simplified time structure of the 
model. Maturity aspects are taken into account in only way: bank profits from 
short-term operations should cover only the cost of debt paid at time t=1. 
 
Sources of funds in our model are treated very simply – the bank can borrow 
at a fixed rate a sum proportional to its owned capital. This simplification is 
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fully deliberate as different banks had different sources of funds and it is very 
hard to model their behavior in a unified way. 
Although the presented time structure is simple, nevertheless we assume that 
even in such setup we could demonstrate how the regulation affects the bank 
choice between short- and long-term investments and the level of risk. 
 
2. Economic setup of the model. 
 
At the beginning it is important to mention that the model is based on J. 
Blum’s paper. We use the same time structure and similar approach to short-
term investments. But the approach to the problem presented in the model 
defers from Blum’s one in two ways. For the first our model analyses the 
impact of regulations on bank risk by assuming that banks can invest in long-
term projects that have a positive NPV denoted there as long term 
investments A(F), while J. Blum’s approach does not imply such a investment 
opportunity. For the second we assume that the cost of deposits is constant 
and does not depend on the bank behavior. 
The main actor in the model is an economic agent, which at an initial 
moment of time owns a bank with some capital. With the help of the bank he 
collects deposits and invest them both in short- and long-term instruments. 
Bank can borrow an amount of funds, which is proportional to its owned 
capital. Certainly, this is not very realistic, still it is quite satisfactory as first 
approximation. Short-term instruments are viewed as financial tools that pay 
revenues each period of time, while long-term as investments into long term 
projects that provides profit to the holder only at the end of the maturity. The 
banker maximizes its (expected) capital at time of realization of return from 
long-term investments. For the sake of model simplicity the banker is 
assumed to be risk-neutral. 
As it was mentioned above, the bank can invest in short-term (in our 
model – one-period) and long-term (two-period) assets. Return on long-term 
instrument is taken to be scale-dependent, which implies existence of some 
"optimal" volume of investments. Short-term instruments are taken to be of 
two forms – riskless and risky. The return on riskless asset is assumed to be 
fixed (scale-independent). The return of risky instrument is also scale-
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independent and controlled by the bank, but depends on probability of getting 
positive return on the instrument. Such a setup implies existence of optimal 
risk level. The model allows to examine both the choice between short- and 
long-term instrument and influence of regulation parameters on "optimality" 
criteria from the bank point of view. 
 
3. The description of the mathematics part of the model 
The model has the following simple time structure. At time t=0 the bank can 
invest all available funds. After one period at time t=1 returns on short-term 
investments are realized. If the bank does not default at time t=2 returns on 
long-term investments are realized too. Although in reality bank reinvest its 
money at time t=1, we will assume that the bank simply stores any free funds it 
has at t=1 (in order to simplify time structure of the model). The final returns are 
realized at time t=2 and all parties are compensated. 
It is assumed that the bank manager is risk neutral and act perfectly in the 
interest of shareholders. This implies that he maximizes the expected value of 
equity. 
The bank is financed by equity(capital) and deposits. The initial stock of 
equity C is exogeniously given. Since depositors are poorly informed about 
bank activities they rely in their solutions on the value of the bank capital. 
Therefore the supply of deposits S(C) depends on the value, where S′(C)>0. 
After one period, the bank has to pay the costs R1∗S(C). 
At t=0 the bank has three investment opportunities: a safe short-term asset, 
a risky short-term portfolio and a risk-free long-term instrument. 
The safe short-term asset has (gross) rate of return R. 
The risk-return structure of the short-term portfolio can be influenced by the 
bank. It can choose a risky short-term instrument from portfolio.  
Specifically, it is assumed that any instrument from risky portfolio has the 
following two-point distribution of the gross rate of return R with the lower 
realization normalized to zero: 
Rr=X with probability 1-p(X) 
Rr=0 with probability p(X),      (3.1) 
For X≥R, with p'(X)>0, p"(X)>0 and p(R)=0.  
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To avoid corner solutions with infinite risk after some point a further increase 
in risk leads to a decrease in expected return. To satisfy this condition it is 
assumed that E(X)=(1-p(X))X is strictly concave. In order for the expected return 
to be increasing in X at R, it is further assumed that 1-p’(R)R>0 . The unique 
level of risk that maximizes expected return is denoted by X* 
(i.e. 0)('1 ** =− XXp ). Denote also maximum expected return by  
))(1( *** XpXR −=      (3.2) 
Obviously, the safe asset is (weakly) dominated by the risky portfolio.  
 In addition to short-term investment the bank can make long-term one. The 
difference between long-term and short-term investments is that in case of long-
term investments the bank does not receive any dividends in interim period and 
long-term instrument is risk-free – if the bank lives through interim period, it will 
certainly collect return in the final period. In our case the interim period consists 
of time t=1. The final return on the long-term investments A(F) depends on the 
value of the investments F in the following way A(F)≥0, A′(F)>0, A”(F)<0.  
If the profits from short-term investments at t=1 are not sufficient to cover the 
costs R1S(C), then the bank defaults and all available funds (if any) are 
transferred to the depositors. Due to limited liability bank owners cannot be 
forced to pay any additional amount of money to cover unfulfilled claims.  
At time t=1 the model has a little different structure from the structure at t=0. 
The costs of deposits S(C) at time t=1 is 0, bank do not reinvest the available 
funds (initial capital C at t=0 plus the profits or losses of the first period reduced 
by amount of long-term investments). It is worth to mention that the model could 
be easily generalized to allow for richer structures in period 2. While possibly 
more realistic, a true replication of the first-period structure in period 2, however, 
would render the model analytically intractable. The main consequence of the 
present approach is that the incentive for asset substitution in period 2 is 
neglected. But since we are interested in the choice of the bank portfolio risk at 
t=0, doing so does not qualitatively affect the results of the paper. 
In our model we will use S(C) of a special form S(C)=kC, where k is a 
positive constant . 
 Further, we suppose that R1 (the cost paid by the bank to lenders) is not 
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more than R (the rate of return on non-risky short-term asset and minimal return 
of risky one – if it succeeds). This is quite natural, as short-term instruments are 
usually profitable for banks. Under this assumption the bank will leave no funds 
non-invested at t=0. Thus if we denote the share of short-term risky investments 
by α, then the volume of funds invested into risky instruments is ( )( )FCk −+1α  
and into non-risky (short-term) instrument ( ) ( )( )FCk −+− 11 α . 
 Finally the time structure of the model can be described by following 
scheme: 
 
 
 
 
As it can be easily seen, R1 (lending rate) can be taken to be unity. Indeed, if 
it is not so, we can transform the model in the following way: 
).()(
,)()(
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R
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→
→
        (3.3) 
After such transformation (which scales all monetary and rate variables 
concerning interim and final periods with the rate of R1), the maximization 
problem of the bank remains essentially the same, which justifies assumption 
of R1=1. 
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. In addition we will assume that short-term lending and deposit rate are 
equal (R=R1=1), although in some cases (for better understanding) we will 
continue to mark the return on safe assets and deposit rate as R and R1 
 
An optimal choice of the bank  
 
 In case of no regulation the bank manager maximizes the final profit at t=2. 
It can be described by the following optimization problem: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
,0)yprobabilitdefault (
)()1()1()1(yprobabilitdefault 1
max
,, α
αα
XF
FAkCFCkXFCk
→×+
++−−+−+−+×−
 (3.4) 
where α is the share of risky short-term assets. 
Due to limited liability the value of equities in case of default is zero and the 
bank can not continue operations. Hence the second term is zero. 
Let us now calculate the default probability. There are three possible cases. 
1) The first case is when the failure of the risky short-term investments, the 
bank stays sound. In term of our framework it means that return from 
riskless instrument cover current expenditures at time t=1 or 
.))1)((1( 1kCRRFCk ≥−+−α     (3.5) 
In other words, if kCFCk ≥−+− ))1)((1( α , then default probability is zero 
(safe policy); 
2) The second case is when the bank stays sound only in case of risky 
short-term investment success, This assumption is equivalent to: 
1))1)((1())1(( kCRRFCkXFCk ≥−+−+−+ αα   (3.6) 
 and  
. .))1)((1( 1kCRRFCk <−+−α     (3.7) 
  In this case, the default probability equals p(X); 
3) The third one is when even in case of successful short-term investment 
realization the bank will go bankrupt. More precisely: 
if 1))1)((1())1(( kCRRFCkXFCk <−+−+−+ αα   (3.8) 
and ,))1)((1( 1kCRRFCk <−+−α then default probability=1. 
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4. Calculations 
 
• The case of safe investment portfolio 
 
It is a specific case, when the bank decides to behave absolutely safely. In 
the case investments into safe asset will be chosen in order to cover short-
term expenditures.  
1))1)((1( kCRRFCk ≥−+−α     (4.1) 
as we assumed R=R1=1 then 
FCk
FC
FCk
kCFCk
−+
−≤⇒
−+
−−+≤ ∗∗
)1()1(
)1(
αα    (4.2) 
 The rest will be distributed between risky asset (because it can be more 
profitable) and long-term investment. 
 As in this case default probability=0 then bank’s problem can be simplified 
to: 
max
,
)()1)()1((
XF
kCFAFkCX →−+−−+ ∗α .   (4.3) 
Let us assume that A`(C)>max [X*(1-P(X*))]. This means that long-term 
investments are attractive enough for bank when its own capital is 
relatively small. In this case the “safe” choice of the bank assumes that 
bank will choose not to invest in the risky assets (α=0). Therefore the bank 
will invest C into long-term project and all the rest will be invested into safe 
short-term instrument. So we can write: F=C, X=1.  
 
• The case of risky investment portfolio 
 
Suppose now that bank opts not to behave safely, i.e. it chooses its portfolio 
so that it will be bankrupt if return on its risky short-term investments turns out to 
be zero (i.e. probability of bankruptcy is p(X)) (case 2). 
Proposition 1 In this case the bank has no incentives to invest into safe 
instrument 1=α   
Proof. 
1Let us assume that α<1. The default probability does not depend on the 
value of α and equals p(X). In case of bankruptcy the bank losses do not 
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depend on the value α too, while in case of success the rate of return on short 
term portfolio is maximized when all available funds are invested into risky 
instrument, thus α=1.g  
 As α=1 then the bank’s problem looks as follows: 
(*)0))1((
))())1))((((1( max
:.:,
≥−−+
→+−−+−
kCFCkX
FAkCXFCkXp
tosFX  (4.4) 
 
• The case of “interim” solution  
 
Suppose now that [ ] CkFCkX >−+ )1( , i.e. that at t=1 the bank in case of 
“good” realization the return on short-term assets gives to the bank more than 
enough money to cover short-term expenditures. Let us denote this case as 
“interim” solution. As we have strict inequality, the first-order conditions will look 
as follows: 
 
)('0))('))((1(:FOC FAXFAXXp
F
=⇒=+−−    (4.5) 
  
[ ] .0)())1(()('))1))(((1(:FOC =+−−+−−+− FAkCXFCkXpFCkxp
X
 (4.6) 
 
This type of solutions can be characterized by the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1. In case of “interim” solution level of risk chosen by bank is 
less than X*, i.e. X≤X*. 
 
Proof. 
1   Suppose that X>X*. That means that:  
[ ]{ }
[ ] { }
{ }
{ } );)())((1()1)((*())(1(
))()1))(((1()1)((*())(1(
)())1)((()(1
)()1()](1[
FFACXXPFCkXXXXP
FAkCCkXXPFCkXXXXP
FAkCFCkXXXXP
FAkCFCkXXP
−+∆−−+−+∆−×∆−−=
=+−+∆−−+−+∆−×∆−−=
=+−−+∆−×∆−−>
>+−−+×−
 
where X*=X-Rr=X-1≥0 
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So at small enough ∆X: 
 
),)())((1())())((1(
);)1)(())((1())1(()](1[
FFACXXPFFACXP
FCkXXXXPFCkXXP
−+∆−−<−+−
−+∆−∆−−<−+−
 
as A(F)>F and C+A(F)-F>0. 
These means that at the same F and less X the bank’s expected profit is 
higher, but if decrease in X is small enough than the inequality 
[ ] CkFCkX >−+ )1(  still holds. The idea of the result is the next, if X>X*, then 
small decrease in X increases expected profit from short-term investments while 
the bank will still have enough to cover its short-term liabilities.g 
 
• The case of “corner” solution 
 
Suppose now that the bank again chooses risky policy (so it will invest 
nothing into safe instrument), i.e. its problem is: 
 
(*)0))1((
))())1))((((1( max
:.:,
≥−−+
→+−−+−
kCFCkX
FAkCXFCkXp
tosFX  (4.4) 
 
Now assume that (4.4*) holds with equality. We call this case “corner” 
solution because the level of risk is chosen just to cover the short-term 
liabilities. In this case the problem will be simplified to: 
 
.0))1((
)())(1( max
:.:,
=−−+
→−
kCFCkX
FAXp
tosXF    (4.7) 
Getting rid of X, we have: ;
1)1(
C
Fk
k
FCk
kCX
−+
=
−+
=  
.max)())1(1( FCF
FA
k
kp →
−+
−   (4.8) 
 
First-order condition for F is: 
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5.The dependence of bank optimal choice on banking regulations 
 
• The regulation that is similar to (h1) norm 
According to h1 standard the value of deposits has to be at least as high as a given 
fraction of own capital. In this model the h1 ratio can be easily modeled by restrictions on k. 
 
• The case of “interim” solution 
 
In this case the solution is given by: 
 
);()'()()('0))('))((1(:FOC 1 XAXFFFAXFAXXp
F
−
==⇒=⇒=+−−  (4.5) 
  
[ ] .0)())1(()('))1))(((1(:FOC =+−−+−−+− FAkCXFCkXpFCkxp
X
 (4.6) 
 
Substituting the first into the second we obtain: 
 
[ ] (5.1) .0))(())()1(()('))()1))(((1(),( =+−−+−−+−≡ XFAkCXXFCkXpXFCkXpkXB
 
Suppose that there exists such X** that satisfies B(X**,k)=0. Than, if X** and 
F**=F(X**) give in fact solution to maximization problem of the bank than 
0
**
2
2
**
<
∂
∂
=
∂
∂
== XXXX XX
B π
. 
We have B(X(k),k)=0 ⇒=
∂
∂
+
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∂
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B
dk
dX  
**
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dk
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=∂
∂
∂
∂
−=   (see 
implicit function theorem). The sign of denominator is known. Let’s look at 
nominator: 
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But (as we have shown) *XX < , so (as ]))(1[()( XXpXE −=  is concave) 
0)(')(1]'))(1[()(' >−−=−= XXpXpXXpXE . Recalling that 0)(' >Xp , we 
obtain that ,0>
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So, we have found how F and X react on changes in k. 
 
• The case of corner solution 
 
Recall first-order condition: 
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=  Suppose F* gives solution to FOC and to maximization 
problem of the bank. We are interested in sign of 
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 Using these inequality we can easily conclude, that 0>
∂
∂
k
D  and therefore: 
.0
*
>
dk
dF      (5.7) 
 
Now let’s look at 
dk
dX . 
In case of corner solution we know that 
C
Fk
kX
−+
=
1
, so  
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=
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−−−+
=   (5.8) 
Denominator of this expression is always positive, so we are interested in 
the sign of nominator. If we take derivative of the nominator with respect to k, 
we will get: 
( ) .2
2
2
2
dk
Fdk
dk
Fdk
dk
dF
dk
dFkFC
dk
d
dk
dF
=++−=+−   (5.9) 
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So, if we assume that 2
2
dk
Fd  is negative (which is quite natural), then we will 
get that the derivative of nominator is a decreasing function. Thus, 
dk
dX  can 
change its sign no more than once (and if it does, it is positive before the 
“change” point and negative after it). 
 
• Safe policy 
 
As shown above, in this case F and X do not depend on k, X=1 (as there is 
no risky investments) and F=C (the bank invests only C into long-term 
instruments under assumption that R=1). 
 
• The existence and allocation of the three types of solutions  
• Transition between solutions 
The question of how the solutions transform one into other as k passes critical 
values (k*,k**), remain unanswered. In fact, little can be said about k* – 
connection of “safe” and “corner” solutions. The case of k** is, however, clear. 
The fact is demonstrated by the following lemmas 
Lemma 1. The solution of “risky” problem (which provides “corner” and “interim” 
solutions) 
(*)0))1((
))())1))((((1( max
:.:,
≥−−+
→+−−+−
kCFCkX
FAkCXFCkXp
tosFX    (4.4) 
 depends continually on k and is unique. 
Proof. 
1 At each level of k the problem is convex – the function maximized is strictly 
convex and the area of possible values of X and F is convex too (it is defined by 
several linear restrictions on X and F – (*) and restrictions of non-negativity of X 
and F). This implies uniqueness of solution at each k. Furthermore, under 
assumptions of smoothness of p(⋅) and A(⋅), this solution is continuos in k.g 
 
Using this lemma, we can easily see that the solution of the maximization 
problem is unique at k=k**, so “corner” and “interim” solutions are continuously 
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connected to each other. Now let us turn to the question of the solutions 
allocations along k line. For this purpose we have to prove two lemmas. 
Lemma 2. If at some k=k1 solution of bank’s problem is of “safe” nature, than for 
1kk <∀  the solutions can be of the “safe” type only. 
Proof. 
1 Indeed, “safe” solution at k=k1 implies that “safe”: portfolio (F=C, X=1) 
provides more expected profit than any “risky” one, which means that 
(expected) marginal profitability of long-term-investments (equaling A’(F=C)) is 
higher than expected marginal profitability of short-term investments (which has 
its maximum at R*). At lower ks expected marginal profitability of both types of 
investments does not change, thus creating no incentives  to turn to the “safe” 
solution.g 
 
Lemma 3. If at some k=k2 solution of the bank’s problem is of “interim” nature, 
then for 2kk >∀  have to be of the same kind. 
Proof. 
1 Suppose k increases from k=k2. Firstly, note that the solution can never 
switch to “safe” one. Indeed, marginal profitability of investments at “safe” 
solution is constant and equals A’(C)>R* while marginal profitability at “interim” 
solution equals X(k) and *)))((1)(( RkXpkX <− , so, as available funds increase, 
no additional incentives to turn to “safe” solution can arise.  
Further, if we consider possibility of switching to “corner” solution, we should 
note that with the increase in k X rises and F falls, so left-hand side of (*), i.e. 
kCFCkX −−+ ))1((  rises, so, taken into account continuos dependence of 
“risky” solutions on k, there are no incentives that may force the bank to turn to 
“corner” solution.g 
 
Finally let us assume that A(F) is such that there is a point, which 
corresponds to the “corner” solution with X>X*. 
These two lemmas and the last assumption allow describing of possible 
variants of placement of these solutions on k line. There are some 
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∞≤≤≤ ***0 kk  such that all “safe” solutions are on ];0[ *kk ∈ , all “corner” 
solutions – on ],[ *** kkk ∈  and “interim” – on ),[ ** ∞∈ kk . 
Moreover, Lemma 1 allows to conclude that k** can be found as crossing 
point of solutions to "corner" and "interim" solutions to problem of the bank in 
case of risky policy. Indeed, as solution is in fact continuos and unique, "corner" 
solution can transform into "interim" only in intersection. 
 
• Implications. 
 
Let us consider the dynamics of F and X with respect to k. If k equals zero 
then bank behaves safely. If k begin to increase then bank will switch to “corner 
strategy” at some critical k=k*. At this point the value of X begin to increase to 
some X>X* (risky investments appear in corner solution) and F jumps from F=C 
in “safe” case to some F≥C in "corner" case as the bank now need to invest less 
in short-term instrument to cover the debt. If k proceeds to increase then at 
k=k** bank will turn to “interim” strategy (at this point expected profits for 
“corner” and “interim” types equals each other). After this point as k increases 
further (to infinity), F tends to F* and X tends to X* as at large k the impact of C 
(and F with A(F)) disappears and X will be chosen to maximize X(1-p(X)+o(X)) 
and thus tend to X* (assuming p(⋅) is smooth enough). The value of F will be 
chosen to maximize essentially X(A(F)-F), and therefore F tends to F* as k 
approaches infinity. The behaviour of F and X is summed up in the following 
graphs: 
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6. Reserve requirements. 
In the real world, there are different norms associated with reserve 
requirements, both on borrowed and invested funds. In the paper we  
concentrate our attention on reserves applied to banks investments. We will 
consider requirements on short-term investments as they are easier to 
implement and enforce, moreover, changes in this regulations face quicker 
response of banks. 
As we can see, the nature of the regulation is quite different from previous 
one and could be modeled as follows. If the agent decides to invest in a risky 
(short-term) instrument P unit of wealth, then he has to reserve βP unit at a 
regulatory site (or, in our model, to invest βP into risk-free instrument). In our 
C 
F* 
F 
k 
X 
k 
X* 
1 
k* k**k*** 
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model we assume that regulating body can distinguish between short-term risky 
investments and long-term ones. Under this assumption such a regulation could 
decrease attractiveness of risky instrument in comparison to long-term 
investments. But the conclusion is very preliminary and overall effect of the 
regulation on bank policy is ambiguous. The following analysis is meant to 
clarify it. 
 
• Calculations 
First of all, it should be noted that the division of solutions (of bank's 
problem) into three kinds still holds - there are solutions where the bank is 
always sound ("safe policy"), solutions where the bank is sound only if risky 
investments succeed ("risky policy"), which in turn subdivides into two cases – 
the one with strict equality of liabilities and short-term returns 
( 0))1)((1())1(( =−−+−+−+ kCFCkFCkX αα ), i.e. "corner solution" and the 
one with inequality ("interim solution"). 
 
• Safe policy 
In this case nothing is invested into risky asset (under assumption of 
** )()(' XXpCA > ), so the reserve requirement changes nothing: 1, == XCF . 
 
• Risky policy 
In this case the bank  invests both into risky and risk-less short-term assets 
(due to nature of regulation), but, again, it also invest into riskless asset no 
more than required. To see this, we rewrite bank problem in case of risky 
policy, i.e. bankruptcy probability is p(X): 
(**)0))1)((1())1((
))())1)((1())1(())((1( max
:.:,
≥−−+−+−+
→+−−+−+−+−
kCFCkFCkX
FAkCFCkXFCkXp
tosFX
αα
αα
 (6.1) 
Reserve requirements restriction looks as follows: 
.
1
11
))1((
))1)((1( *
βααβα
αβ
α
α
+
=≤⇔≥−⇔≥
−+
−+−
FCk
FCk   (6.2) 
So, again, there is no point for the bank to invest into safe asset no more than 
required as in case of bankruptcy the bank will get zero (i.e. extra investments 
into riskless asset make no difference) and in case of success the bank profit 
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would increase as α increases up to α*. So, βαα +== 1
1*  and bank's problem 
can be rewritten as follows: 
kCXFCk
FAkCXFCkXp
tosFX
≥−+−+
→+−−+−+−
)1)()1((
))()1)()1))(((1(
**
:.:,
** max
αα
αα
  (6.3) 
 
• Behaviour of F 
  
Let us introduce new variable and function: 
( ))1)(1(111)(
,1
*
**
β
α
αα
β
β
ββ
β
+−+=


 −
+=
−+=
Xp
X
pXp
XX
      (6.4) 
In terms of Xβ and pβ(⋅) bank's problem will look like: 
 
0))1((
))())1))((((1( max
:.:,
≥−−+
→+−−+−
kCFCkX
FAkCXFCkXp
tosFX
β
βββ
  (6.5) 
This is the same problem we had in unrestricted case for risky policy (compare 
with (4.4)) and, as we see below, pβ(⋅) has all required properties. So, for each 
β all results above still hold (in terms of these new Xβ and pβ(⋅)). Further, we are 
going to analyze dependence of solution on regulation parameter β. We start 
with description of Xβ and pβ(⋅)  
** 1 ααβ −+= XX  – just linear function of X . 
( ))1)(1(1)( ββββ +−+= XpXp  – again, convex function and .0)1( =βp  
Indeed, 
.0)1())1)(11(1()1(
,0))1)(1(1('')1()(
, 0))1)(1(1(')1()(
2''
'
==+−+=
>+−++=
>+−++=
ppp
XpXp
XpXp
β
ββ
ββ
β
βββ
βββ
   (6.6) 
Xβ can be described as weighed return of portfolio consisting of α* of risky asset 
and (1-α* ) of safe asset. 
 
Now we are going to consider "interim" and "corner" solutions. 
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• Corner solution 
 
As we know, solution satisfies (compare with (4.9)): 
.
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We are interested in 
F
D
D
d
dF
∂
∂
∂
∂
−=
β
β . It is known from earlier considerations, 
0<
∂
∂
F
D . Look at β∂
∂D : 
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.1for  0))1)(1(1('))1)(1(1(')1())('(
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XXpXXp
ββββ
ββ
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Thus, 0<
∂
∂
∂
∂
−=
F
D
D
d
dF β
β , i.e., as β rises (requirements toughen), F falls (note 
that Xβ falls too).  
 
• Interim solution 
In this case solution satisfies (compare with (5.1)): 
[ ]
)()'()( where
(6.8) ,0))(())()1(()('))()1))(((1(
),,(
1
ββ
ββββββββ
β
XAXFF
XFAkCXXFCkXpXFCkXp
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=
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Firstly, we will analyze the sign of 
β
β β
β
X
B
B
d
dX
∂
∂
∂
∂
−=  and, again, we know that 
0<
∂
∂
βX
B . Now let us look at β∂
∂B : 
[ ] .0))(())()1(())('(
))()1))((((
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XFAkCXXFCkXp
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Thus, 0<
∂
∂
∂
∂
−=
β
β β
β
X
B
B
d
dX
, i.e. Xβ falls as β rises. This means that 
)()'( 1 βXAF
−
=  rises. 
 
Thus, we have different behavior of F in "corner" and "interim" solutions. This 
allows to deduce that k** rises as β rises. Indeed, as k** can be determined 
from crossing of curves, which give solutions for "corner" and "interim" cases 
(see figure below) and F is increasing in k at k∈[k*,k**] (under the assumptions 
made above) and decreasing at k>k**. Thus, crossing point will move to the 
right as β rises. 
 
 
C 
F* 
F 
k 
k* k**(β) k**(β+∆β) 
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• Behaviour of X 
Although we know that Xβ falls as β rises in both "interim" and "corner" 
solutions, )1)(1(1 ββ +−+= XX can move either way with rise of β. 
Nevertheless, in case of "interim" solution it can be shown that X falls. 
So, suppose that solution is of "interim" nature (and remains "interim" if β varies 
slightly), i.e. kCXFCk >−+−+ )1)()1(( ** αα .  Firstly, we will show that, as in 
unrestricted case, the level of risk can not be "too high": 
 
Proposition 1'. In case of "interim solution" X≤X*. 
Proof. 
1 
The logic is the same as in case of the capital requirement: in "interim solution", 
if X>X*, small decrease in X can not disturb "resource inequality" 
kCXFCk >−+−+ )1)()1(( ** αα , increasing at the same time expected profit 
from the short-term investments and increasing the probability of obtaining 
return from the long-term investments (i.e. increasing expected return from 
them). Again, at small enough ∆X 
).)1)((1))((1())1)((1))((1(
);())(1()())(1(
);)1)((())(1())1(()](1[
FCkXPFCkXP
FAXXPFAXP
FCkXXXXPFCkXXP
−+−−=−+−−
∆−−<−
−+∆−∆−−<−+−
αα
αα
 
Thus, summing these three (in)equalities, we will get that at small enough ∆X 
expected profit of the bank can only increase. 
 
So, in case of "interim solution", X≤X*, and 0)(')(1 >−− XXpXp . 
g 
Now rewrite bank problem as follows (forgetting about "resource inequality"): 
[ ] max
:
***
***
))())1)((1()1(
)1)1(())1())(((1(
→+−−+−+−++
+−+−−+−
FAkCFCkCk
kCkXFCkXp
ααα
ααα
  (6.10) 
Then, denoting: 
)),())1)((1()1()(
,
,1)1( i.e. ),1(1
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*
**
FAkCFCkCkFA
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β
ββ
  (6.11) 
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we will get exactly the same problem we had in unrestricted case, but in terms 
of βββ AFk  and ,, . Concavity of Aβ(⋅) holds (as A(⋅) is disturbed by linear function) 
and positivity of A' will hold if we suppose that A'(F)>1-α*, which is certainly true 
if α* is not very low (i.e. β is not very high) or F is not very high. So, we are 
again reduced the problem to the sort we solved above and we know that 
solution is given by: 
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So, 0<
∂
∂
β
X , i.e. in "interim" solution the toughening of requirements leads to 
decrease in the level of risk (at least if β is not too high). 
The question of behaviour of X in case of corner solution remains unanswered, 
it should depend of properties of A(⋅) and p(⋅). 
 
• The existence and allocation of the three types of solutions  
• Transition between solutions 
Behaviour of the three types of solution resembles the case of capital 
restriction. In fact, all lemmas for capital restriction have their counterparts in 
case of reserve requirements. 
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Lemma 1'. The solution of “risky” problem (which provides “corner” and “interim” 
solutions) 
kCXFCk
FAkCXFCkXp
tosFX
≥−+−+
→+−−+−+−
)1)()1((
))()1)()1))(((1(
**
:.:,
** max
αα
αα
   (6.3) 
 depends continually on k and β and is unique. 
The proof of it is fully similar to the proof of Lemma 1, which is based on 
convexity of the problem. 
Again, it follows that "corner" and "interim" solutions are continuously 
connected. 
Allocation of solutions can be deduced from following lemmas: 
 
Lemma 2'. If at some β=β1 solution of bank’s problem is of “safe” nature, than 
for 1ββ >∀  the solutions can be of the “safe” type only. 
Proof. 
1 Again, it is similar to Lemma 2. Intuitively, the less free resources the bank 
has, the less incentives it has to deviate from "safe" strategy, i.e. turn to risky 
assets. g 
 
Lemma 3'. If at some β=β2 solution of the bank’s problem is of “interim” nature, 
than 2ββ <∀  can be of the same kind. 
Proof. 
1 Again, as in Lemma 3, additional resources can only reduce incentives to 
turn either to "safe" of "corner" policy.g 
Furthermore, at very high βs (in neighborhood of unity) the bank is clearly at 
"safe" solution (as it in fact can not invest in risky instrument). On the other 
hand, at β=0 (i.e. in unrestricted case), the kind of solution is defined by k: for 
k∈[0,k*] – "safe" solution, k∈[k*,k**] – "corner" solution, k∈[k**,+∞] – "interim" 
solution. As β decreases from unity to zero, the solution can transform from 
"safe" to "corner", then to "interim", but never in reverse order, i.e. there exist 
such 1≥β*≥β**≥0 that for β∈[β*,1] the solution is of "safe" nature, for β∈[β**,β*] – 
"corner" and for β∈[0,β**] – "interim". The figure below (on the left) illustrates a 
behaviour of F and X with respect to β. The value of k is taken to be greater 
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than k** to show all kinds of solutions (if not, "interim" solutions can not exist for 
such k). Moreover, it is assumed that β** is small enough so that X really 
decreases as β increases from zero to β*. 
In another case (k<k** – depicted on the right-hand side) the bank operates in 
"corner" mode even if β=0. Such a behaviour can be interpreted as follows: if 
capital requirements are excessively toughened, relaxation of reserve 
requirements (even down to zero) can not make bank operate in "interim" 
mode. 
 
 
Implications. 
 
As one can see, both kinds of regulation: h1 norm and reserve 
requirements (which we model through variation of k and β correspondingly) 
affect the behaviour of banks in rather similar way. We can sum up their effect 
on X and F in following table: 
C
 
F
β 
X
β 
 
1
β*
*
β* 1 
C 
F 
β 
X 
β 
 
1
1 β* 
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 "corner" solution "interim" solution 
 F X F X 
Increase in k + +/- - + 
Increase in β - +/- + - 
 
Taking into account that an increase in k is treated as the relaxing of 
regulation, while increase in β – as toughening, one can see that both kinds of 
regulations affect banks' behaviour in the same way. Additionally, toughening of 
either regulation can make from "interim" bank "corner" one: as k decreases, it 
can simply become lower than k** while increase in β increases k**. So, the 
model can not provide unique answer which kind of regulation is "better". Other 
factors should be taken into account, the discussion of which is outside of this 
model 
 
7. Policy implications 
 
Now let us turn to the banking regulation. We are going to speak about 
capital requirements regulation, but said below is relevant for reserve 
requirements also. Specific features of the regulation are to be discussed in 
conclusion. Moreover, we are going to discuss well-timed measures, when 
banks have enough time to adapt their portfolios. 
Let us assume that banking supervisors are not satisfied with current 
standing of banking system and the only available instrument is the regulation 
of k. Suppose that kmax, which corresponds to a particular bank, is more than 
k**. In this case the regulators can reach desired effect through the toughening 
of the capital requirement. In this case the level of risk falls and the level of 
long-term investments increases. But as regulation strengthens, kmax  reaches 
k** and becomes even lower. After that the bank behavior changes. The level of 
long-term investments begins to decrease and the level of riskiness - to 
increase. After reaching k*** which corresponds to the maximal level of X both 
the risk and amount of long-term investments falls until the switching at k=k* to 
the lowest level, which corresponds to safe policy.  
Let us now consider how this framework could be applied to Russian case.  
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Firstly, let us examine the case of a large Russian bank that was a member of 
FIG. As such a bank had a lot investment opportunities provided through their 
control over FIG’s enterprises, it is only logical to assume that the level of long 
term investment was high. In our model such an investment choice is 
characterized by “corner solution”. It means that critical levels of k are such 
that k***<k<k**, where k corresponds to the bank’s level. It was shown that in 
the case toughening of capital requirements would reduce long-term 
investments, but has unclear effect on the level of the risk. If k<k***, then the 
regulators would reach desired effect, but if k***<k<k**, then it would be 
unclear – a small decrease in k would lead to an increase in X, while a large 
one (making k less than k***) – will lead to a decrease, making total effect 
ambiguous. But the experience of Russia demonstrated that the largest banks 
that had significant long-term investments conducted excessively risky policy. 
Therefore such banks in our framework are represented by ks that lie in the 
neighborhood of k***. Thus a well-timed substantial toughening of the capital 
requirement would improve the banks stability. 
Let us turn to the case of small and medium Russian banks which 
typically had relatively small amount of long-term investments. These banks 
usually earned their profits from short-term operations. Thus, such banks can 
be considered as being in “interim” solution mode (k>k**). As it was studied 
above under this condition toughening of capital restrictions has unclear 
effect. If the requirement toughened not very significantly (kmax>k**) then the 
regulatory authorities would reach the desired effect. In this case the banks 
decrease the level of risk and improve their long-term position. But in case of 
further strengthening of the regulation the banks would be forced to switch 
into riskier mode (“corner” solution), sharply increasing the level of risk. 
Therefore in case of small and medium Russian banks too strong capital 
requirements could have perverse effect, only increasing the risk of banks 
portfolios. 
As one can see, toughening of capital requirements would have 
unclear effect on banking sector of Russia – soundness of one group of banks 
would improve, while another group would suffer. Thus, we can deduce that 
introduction of bank specialisation could significantly improve the situation. 
Capability to issue different regulations for different groups of banks would 
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provide regulating bodies with instruments for simultaneous decrease in levels 
of risk taken by all banks. 
As we have shown, two ways of banking regulation (capital 
requirements and reserve requirements), while quite different, affect banks 
very similarly. As the model itself can not provide unique answer, which kind 
of regulation is preferable, other factors should be taken into account. Firstly, 
these regulations have different effect on money demand: toughening capital 
requirements decreases money demand while reserve requirements do not. 
Decrease in money demand is usually unfavorable for regulator: excess 
money allow for creation of new banks, which increases competition and 
decreases overall stability of banking sector. Secondly, toughening reserve 
requirements directly increases reserves, which decreases potential losses of 
creditors and depositors and improve overall stability. 
Moreover, there are differences in efficiency of the two regulations, 
which can not be demonstrated in our framework. Consider two banks and 
suppose that regulating body goes to slightly toughen the norms for both 
banks. If individual ks of these banks significantly differ, then capital 
requirement for one of the banks will be non-limiting (and thus inefficient); if 
the regulator would want to affect both banks, one of the bank will face 
excessive regulation. Reserve requirements have no such deficiency. Slight 
toughening of reserve norms will be limiting for both banks. Thus, as both 
kinds of regulation affect banks’ stability in similar way, reserve requirements 
seem to be preferable from the standpoint of versality. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has shown that there was a large field for improvement of 
Russian banking legislation. The CB could implement a number of regulation 
that proved their efficiency in developed countries as well as use existing 
regulations more effectively.  
It was shown how toughening of regulations would have positive effect 
on soundness of one group of banks while worsening situation of others. 
Moreover, it was demonstrated how supervisory authorities could significantly 
improve the banking sector stability through the application of capital and 
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reserve requirements and the only condition for their successive implementation 
was the introduction of banking specialisation. Additionally, it was shown that 
the two regulations affect the riskiness of bank portfolio in the same manner 
although the overall effect of the regulations on the economy differ in many 
ways. 
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Appendix.An analysis of major causes of Russian banks’ bankruptcy 
 
The classification of main causes of the bankruptcy 
Russian bank met serious problems much earlier the GKO default. The 
basic characteristics began to worsen beginning from January 1998. For 
instance aggregated capital of the largest twenty Russian banks (excluding 
Sberbank and Vneshtorgbank) decreased by 15 per cent during the first half 
of 1998, the aggregated value of liquid assets had shortened three times for 
the same period of time. 
There were a lot of various other causes that worsened banks’ 
conditions. For example, banks fiercely competed for all spheres of business, 
qualification of bank managers was too low, there were a small number of 
profitable instruments in Russia etc. There is a list of most significant 
problems. 
• Excessive dependence of the banks on foreign credits 
• The massive withdrawing of deposits 
• Low quality of banking management 
• Excessive dependence of the banks on associated non-financial 
companies 
• Depreciation of Russian government bonds  
• GKO default 
• Off-balance activities (forward contracts) 
The presence of the problems was typical for all Russian largest banks, 
although the value of losses from particular one differs from bank to bank.  
After the enumeration of the problems let us consider each of them in 
more details. 
1) GKO-OFZ, OVVZ and eurobonds of Russia. 
At the time of Asian financial crisis Russian banks had a large portion 
of the government bonds (GKO, OFZ, OVVZ and eurobonds) in their 
investment portfolios. The aggregated value of the bonds was more than 11 
billion dollars.  
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Table 1. Government bonds  
Share of the government bonds in the banks assets Bank 
01.12.96 01.04.97 01.09.97 01.10.98 
Sberbank of 
Russia 
55,78 63.41 66.06 54.63 
Vneshtorgbank 21,29 24.67 27.27 10.82 
NRB 69,01 50.63 39.19 7.69 
Gazprombank 9,97 12.26 8.52 2.72 
IFC 16,79 27.28 14.16 5.03 
International 
Moscow Bank 
- 18.06 15.04 8.18 
MIB 12,92 15.10 15.39 8.83 
Onexim-bank 9,78 10.74 9.46 11.79 
Mosbusinessbank 25,58 27.92 27.11 17.72 
Avtobank 35,67 27.70 41.15 21.59 
SBS-Agro 41,38 37.69 29.67 4.14 
 
The worsening financial situation in developing countries negatively 
influenced the value of the long term bonds (OVVZ, GKO, PRIN, IAN) prices. 
The prices and liquidity of Russian foreign bonds began to decrease at the 
beginning of 1998 year, as a result of it banks incurred significant losses, in 
some cases they exceeded own capital of banks. Triggered sells of the bonds 
further decreased prices. Finally, the market was destroyed by the August 
default. 
The situation with GKO-OFZ differs a little from foreign debts one. The 
situation on GKO-OFZ market began to worsen in 1997. But the maturity of 
GKO issue was in average equal to one year, so bank could hold bonds until 
its maturity, because of GKO had not lost liquidity. Thus, the banks did not 
make efforts to diminish the fraction of GKO-OFZ in their portfolios. Moreover, 
even after the default, especially for the largest banks, GKO remained as a 
relatively liquid asset.  
Thus, it is possible to state that the GKO default did not seriously hurt 
the banks, and banks incurred much higher losses from operations with 
foreign government bonds. 
2) Withdrawal of deposits  
During 1998 enterprise accounts steadily decreased in value. To the 
middle of 1998 the deposits in rouble had shortened by 7 per cent, in foreign 
currency by 6 per cent with comparing to the beginning of 1998. 
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Table 2. Deposits 
 
Ap
r 9
8 
Ju
l 9
8 
Au
g 
98
 
Se
p 
98
 
O
ct
 9
8 
D
ec
 9
8 
Deposits in billion RUR 153,4 155,7 150,9 135,5 123,7 125,9 
Sberbank 120,7 121,2 117,3 108,4 101,3 107,9 
The other banks 32,7 34,5 33,6 27,1 22,4 18 
Deposits in foreign currency 
billion $. 
5,5 6,1 6,5 5 4,5 3,1 
Sberbank 2,2 2,4 2,6 1,9 1,7 1,3 
The other banks 3,3 3,7 3,9 3,1 2,8 1,8 
source- S.Alexashenko, “The Banking crisis”, Voprosi Economiki, N5 
The situation with private deposits is a little different from previous one. 
Depositors behaved coolly, it allowed banks to compensate the losses of 
liquidity though the attracting of deposits. During the period from April to 
August 1998, the growth of deposits in SBS-Agro came to 12 per cent, in 
Inkom-bank – 17 per cent, in MENATEP – 25 per cent, in Russian Credits – 
74 per cent. As a result of it the share of deposits in total liabilities of the four 
banks increased from 20 per cent on 01.04.98 to 34 per cent on 01.08.98 and 
of the full banking system from 9,5 per cent to 10,5 per cent. Only in July total 
amount of deposits began to decrease. During the month the value of 
deposits in rouble and foreign currency decreased by 1,1 per cent. And only in 
August 1998 people began to withdraw deposits. Because of it in the third 
decade their amount felt more than two times. The banking system (excluding 
Sberbank) lost 46 per cent of rouble deposits and 54 per cent of foreign 
currency deposits. 
3) Liquidity problems 
Russian banks at the moment of crisis had comparably low liquidity 
level. This is due to the fact that during first half of 1998 they had to cover 
losses. GKO default has lowered liquidity even more. If one include GKO into 
liquid assets then share of liquid ass ets among all assets was 28%, which 
corresponded to the volume of demand liabilities. Due to this a lot of banks 
could not serve their obligations at first days of the crisis.  
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Table 3. Liquidity 
Ratio Jan 97 
Jul 97 
Jan 98 
Jul 98 
Sep 98 
O
ct 98 
D
ec 98 
 To assets        
Liquid assets 6,1 3,7 5,3 4,9 5,3 6,8 7,1 
Extended liquid assets 31,2 32,7 28,6 25,9 25,9 14,9 15,1 
To liabilities        
Liquid assets 7,3 4,6 6,7 6,2 6,5 8,1 8,2 
Extended liquid assets 40,1 40,4 36,6 32,7 26,1 17,5 17,5 
To deposits        
Liquid assets 30,8 18,5 28,4 19,4 22 34,2 44,7 
Extended liquid assets 158,2 128,4 154,4 102,4 88,1 74,2 95,2 
source- S.Alexashenko, “The Banking crisis”, Voprosi Economiki, N5 
4) Foreign debts 
On 01.07.98 the value of banks’ debts to foreign creditors was more 
than 8 billion dollars. More than 75 per cent of the credits belonged to the 20 
largest banks. Their deposit and credit liabilities to non-residents came to 21 
per cent of their liabilities. For some of the banks (SBS-Agro, Imperial, TOKO-
bank) the value exceeded 30 per cent level. 
Table 4. Foreign Debts 
Foreign debts 01.10.98  Bank 
Short 
term 
liabilities  
Syndicated 
credits 
Bonds in 
foreign 
currency 
Aggregate
d liabilities 
Sberbank 100 225  325 
Inkombank 274 140  414 
Russian credit 118 229 200 547 
SBS-Agro 631 113  744 
ONEXIM-bank 353 70 300 723 
MENATEP 515 80  595 
Vneshtorgbank 356 120  476 
Alfa-bank 214 77 175 466 
NRB 208 42  250 
Avtobank 108 47  155 
Most-bank 129   129 
IFC 97  51 148 
Vozrozhdenie 51   51 
Bank of Moscow 15 20  35 
Aggregated 
liabilities  
3 169,00   1 163,00   726,00   5 058,00   
Source: IC “Troika-Dialog”, an. survey “The Russian Banking Sector: Life After Death” 
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The existing disparity between the level of profitability of instruments 
nominated in rouble and foreign currency allowed earning extraordinary profit. 
Most of foreign credit sources were invested in rouble instruments by the 
banks. But after 1998-year devaluation banks being involved in such activities 
incurred huge losses. 
5) Off-balance operations, forward contract debts   
Liabilities of Russian banks concerned with forward contracts 
exceeded 10 billion dollars. The largest part of contracts were made in the 
period from April to June 1998, when the majority of non-residents decided to 
stop investing in Russia bond market and began to actively offer forward 
contracts to the banks. The indebtedness of the nine largest forward contracts 
market participators (Sberbank, Vneshtorgbank, ONEXIMbank, SBS-Agro, 
MENATEP, IFC, Gazprombank) amounted to 3 billion dollars on 01.07.98, it 
was more than a third of the banking system forward debts. The amount of 
forward contracts liabilities in some cases exceeded not only own capital but 
assets of banks (Inkom-bank – 56,2 times capital and 4,7 times assets on 
01.07.98, NRB- 28,6 and 9,4, SBS-Agro- 10,8 and 1,2, ONEXIMbank- 9,2 and 
1,2). The following table depicts the volume of forward contracts for 10 
Russian banks. 
Table 5. Forward contracts debts 
Bank Forward 
contracts 
1998.10.01 
ONEXIM-bank 1900 
Inkom-bank 1884 
Vneshtorgbank 608 
Avtobank 380 
Sberbank 325 
NRB 268 
MENATEP 100 
SBS-Agro 84 
Russian Credit 70 
IFC 51 
Source: IC “Troika-Dialog”, an. survey “The Russian 
 Banking Sector: Life After Death” 
 
For one’s turn the largest banks made a contract with banks from “the 
second level” (MDM-bank, Unibest etc.). It made a lot of banks to be involved 
in the forward market. As a result, after the devaluation a huge amount of 
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banks found themselves in difficult situation, the largest participators of the 
market incurred losses compared with their assets.  
6) Participation of banks in Financial Industrial Groups 
Almost all largest private banks participated in various Financial 
Industrial Groups. It allowed banks to decrease the risk of investments for 
production companies, which in turn increased the inflow of credits in the 
domestic industry. It was the main cause why not only banks, but also CB and 
government actively supported this interdependence. Foreign investors also 
considered the connections as a positive one. Most of syndicated credits were 
provided to the banks for development of FIG. 
 
Table 6. Banks & FIGs 
Bank FIG Type of credit Mln. $ 
Alfa-bank Volzhskay Oil Syndicated 77 
Russian credit TANAKO Syndicated 217 
Inkom bank Nosta Oil Syndicated 503 
MENATEP MENATEP-Rosprom Syndicated 80 
IFC INTERROS  Syndicated 85 
ONEXIM-bank Volzhskay Oil Credit back-up line 170 
SBS-Agro Volskay Oil Syndicated  198 
Source: AC “Vedi”, book “Russian Banking System: the crisis and the future”  
But this co-operation had an adverse effect too. In most cases the 
owner of banks were simultaneously the owners of plant, which formed FIG. 
As a result of it, interests of banks were in minor position to interests of FIG. 
Moreover, the companies, which actively used resources of banks, were not 
bound with liabilities of the banks. As an example of such a relationship FIG 
“MENATEP-ROSPROM-UKOS”. 
 
Table 7. Banks & Enterprises 
Ba
nk
 Inkom-bank 
 
Russian Credit TOKO-bank 
In
du
st
ry
 Food 
Engineering industry 
Military-industrial 
establishment 
Metallurgy 
Ferrous metallurgy 
Non-ferrous metallurgy 
Gold mining 
Metallurgy 
Building 
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co
m
pa
ni
es
 
JSC “Babaevskoe” 
JSC “Rot Front” 
Novosibirsk candy 
UzhUralKonditer 
Sormovskay candy 
Energomash  
Sea Technician of 
non-nuclear under water 
shipbuilding 
OKB Suhigi 
NOSTA-PIPE-GAS 
JSC “SAMECO” 
 
TOCHNOST 
TANAKO 
Svytogor 
Rushim  
Oskolskiy still-rolling plant  
Krasnoyrskiy aluminium 
plant  
Novolipeckiy ferrous plant  
Mihailovskiy GOK 
Stoilenskiy GOK 
Lebedinskiy GOK 
MIKOM 
Plants of Kursk region 
Novokuzneckiy ferrous 
plant 
Novokuzneckiy 
aluminium plant 
TOKO-House 
TOKO-Tower 
ba
nk
 SBS-Agro MENATEP 
 
Imperial 
in
du
st
ry
 Oil 
Non-ferrous metallurgy 
Financial 
Oil 
Heavy engineering 
industry 
Food  
Textile  
Oil gas 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 Sibneft 
Dragocennosti of Ural 
Agroprombank 
UKOS  
Rosprom 
JSC “GAZ” 
“Russian products” 
«Russian textile» 
Lukoil 
RAO “Gazprom” 
Ba
nk
 ONEXIM-bank 
 
Alfa-bank Most bank 
in
du
st
ry
 Non-ferrous metallurgy 
Oil gas 
Transportation 
Precision engineering 
Oil 
Construction 
Retail 
Real estate 
Information 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 Norilsk nikel 
Novolipeck ferrous 
plant 
Sidanko 
North West  
LOMO 
TNK 
Alfa-Cement 
Alfa-Estate 
Eho of Moscow 
 Newspaper “Seven day” 
Newspaper “Today”  
Journal “Itogi” 
TV company NTV 
Satellite TV NTV+ 
 
It can be seen from the table above, that most of the banks that met 
solvency problems after the crisis actively participated in FIG and owned of a 
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large number of enterprises. At the same time most of enterprises, member of 
the FIG successfully went through the crisis. As an example, FIG “MENATEP-
Rosprom-Ukos” can be considered. Oil company “Ukos” strongly develops its 
business, at the same time “MENATEP” – former owner of the company 
collapsed in the second half of 1998. The same situation is in cases of 
“Norilsk Nickel & ONEXIMbank”, “Lukoil & Imperial”, “Aluminium plants 
&Russian Credits”. 
